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FILE No. **NEM 3/359/1** (Part )

**TITLE: ATTITUDE OF IRAQ TO A  
SETTLEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST**

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PART

FILE No. **NEM 3/359/1**

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**1970**


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Rea		18/3						
VB	1	19/3						
Ree								
Mr Hinchcliffe	223							
V.B.		3/7						
C. J.M.	4.	4/7						
R.	—	10/8						
Miss Basset	5	✓						
R.	—	24/8						
V.B.	File	25/8						
R.	—	27/8						
V.B.	8	27/8						
R.	—	1/9						
C. J.M.	B.U.	2/9						
R.	—							

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British Embassy,  
BAGHDAD.



(2/4)

15/2

Dear Peter,

Conference of Arab Front Line States

General Saleh Mehdi Ammash, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, returned on 11 February from Cairo where he attended the Conference of Arab Front Line States. The brief statement he made on his return follows the lines of the official communique. It is strongly anti-American and includes the threat to "eliminate American interests in Arab countries should America persist in her hostile attitude". On the question of strategy General Ammash saw no alternative to an escalation of the fighting and said that Israeli withdrawal could only be achieved by the "force of Arab military pressure". Insofar as it is possible to deduce anything from such small fare, this would seem to mean that the present policy of confrontation is to be continued and developed to a stage short of war.

2. We have no evidence here to support the suggestion (in paragraph 2 of Cairo's telno. 213 of 10 February) that the Iraqis did not attend all sessions of the conference. However their reticence both in Cairo and on their return to Baghdad and the little attention paid to the subject in the press suggest that they are not happy with the way the conference went. Without further information it is difficult to say why, but a possible reason lies in the apparent refusal of the conference to take any major decisions such as those proposed by the Iraqis at the Rabat Summit.

*Yours sincerely*  
*Ulley*

(M. K. Jenner)

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

c.c. Chanceries at: Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Tripoli

16/2/70

I suspect the Egyptian and Jordanian representatives said too much for the taste of the Iraqis about the need to keep open the door to a "political solution".

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R.E. 73

EN CLAIR

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ROUTINE BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

ELNO 456

27 JUNE 1970

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29 JUN

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 456 OF 27 JUNE AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO, BEIRUT, AMMAN, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, ALGIERS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO RABAT, ~~TUNIS, ADEN,~~, MOSCOW, PARIS AND UKDEL NATO.

(42) *ven 2/26*

MY TEL NO 454 OF 25 JUNE:

IRAQI PLAN FOR CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL.

AL-THAWRA ON 25 JUNE DISCUSSES AT LENGTH THE NEED FOR A CO-ORDINATED ARAB PLAN TO CONFRONT ISRAEL. THE PRIMARY ELEMENT OF THIS PLAN MUST BE FINANCIAL, AND THE EDITORIAL RECOMMENDS (A) FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM EVERY ARAB STATE ASSESSED ACCORDING TO INCOME PER HEAD. WHERE THIS INCOME IS INADEQUATE A STATE SHOULD CONTRIBUTE MEN: (B) THE SETTING UP OF A "CENTRAL SUPERVISORY BODY" TO ADMINISTER THESE CONTRIBUTIONS AND BUY ARMAMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE STRATEGY LAID DOWN BY THE ARAB STATES.

2. THE ARTICLE CONTINUES THAT IT IS NOT LOGICAL THAT ARAB STATES SHOULD ACT ACCORDING TO THEIR SEPARATE POLICIES AND CONTRIBUTE SEPARATELY TO THE CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL REGARDLESS OF THEIR FINANCIAL RESOURCES. ANY STATE WHICH DID NOT CONTRIBUTE ACCORDING TO THIS PLAN WOULD BE CONSIDERED AN ALLY OF ISRAEL AND WOULD BE DEALT WITH ACCORDINGLY. ACCORDING TO AL-THAWRA IRAQ HAS BEEN PROMOTING THIS PLAN SINCE THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN RABAT. THE THEN IRAQI MINISTER OF INFORMATION HAD LATER TOURED THE ARAB STATES IN AN ATTEMPT TO ENLIST SUPPORT FOR THIS PLAN BUT TO NO AVAIL.

THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES BY SAYING THAT THE ARAB STATES CANNOT CONFRONT ISRAEL WITHOUT CO-ORDINATION OF MILITARY PURCHASES: ONE WELL-ARMED ARAB STATE IS OF LITTLE AVAIL IF THE OTHERS ARE INADEQUATELY ARMED.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO RABAT, ~~TUNIS,~~ ADEN, MOSCOW, PARIS AND UKDEL NATO.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]  
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29 JUN 1970

~~NEC 3/369~~

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ROUTINE BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

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27 JUNE 1970

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②  
M.I.P.T.

THIS EDITORIAL IN THE BA'ATH PARTY NEWSPAPER APPEARS TO SPELL OUT THE FINANCIAL AND ARMS PURCHASING ARRANGEMENTS ORIGINALLY TABLED BY THE IRAQIS AT THE RABAT SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN DECEMBER 1969 ( MY TELNO 1050 OF 29 DECEMBER 1969.) IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT STATEMENTS THAT THIS IRAQI PLAN HAD BEEN AMALGAMATED WITH THE QADDAFI PLAN( MY TELNO 454 OF 25 JUNE), IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT ARRANGEMENTS ON THESE LINES WERE DISCUSSED BY THE ARAB LEADERS DURING THEIR RECENT MEETING IN TRIPOLI. NO MENTION IS MADE IN THE AL-THAWRA PROPOSALS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE FEDAYEEN NOR IS IT SAID WHETHER CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMANDO ORGANISATIONS WOULD BE OFFSET AGAINST A STATE'S ASSESSED CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE PROPOSED PLAN.

2. THE IRAQI PROPOSALS ARE PRESUMABLY DESIGNED IN THE HOPE THAT THE EQUIPMENT OF IRAQ'S ARMED FORCES WOULD BE PAID FOR BY LIBYA, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND OTHER RICH STATES WITH SMALL POPULATIONS.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO ALGIERS, KHARTOUM AND WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO RABAT, TUNIS, ADEN, MOSCOW, PARIS AND UKDEL NATO.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

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
*4/7*

*22/1*

*Mr. Mahdi*  
*Mrs. Beckett B14/*  
*McLoughlin*

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(4)



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

4 July 1970.

*Dear Peter,*

Iraqi attitude to the Palestine question

Please refer to the Ambassador's letter EPH/70 of 7 March to Arthur (not to all) which dealt with some aspects of the Iraqi attitude to the Palestine question.


2. An interview given by President Bakr to the Beirut Magazine Al-Ahad was given some prominence in the Iraqi press. The interview as a whole is of little interest; however in answering a final question on Iraq's attitude to a peaceful solution of the Palestine question the President said "... the Palestine issue is the property of the people of Palestine who alone have the right to determine their future. Any means therefore adopted by these proud people for restoring its rights will meet with receptivity and support on our part". This reply is significant not only as a public confirmation by the President of the views expressed privately by Ammash and Shaikly to Mr. Brown (see paragraph 2 of our telegram No. 33 of 12 January not to all) but also for the omission of any reference to "armed struggle" as the only possible solution to the conflict. Indeed the expression "any means" in the President's answer ought from the context to refer to, or at least embrace, the "peaceful solution" hypothecated in the question he was answering. One might deduce from this that, although at present the Palestinian commando organisations are publicly committed to a military solution, Iraq would nevertheless support them in the remote eventuality of a political solution being found that was acceptable to, at least, the more moderate Palestinian organisations. This analysis is not necessarily contradicted by a further interview given by President Bakr to the Beirut pro-Iraqi Al-Sayyad, in which he said that Iraq did not believe any fruitful results could come from political settlements in the Middle East; he again said that the problem of Palestine was for the Palestinian people to deal with as they thought appropriate, but "the imposition (my underlining) of a peaceful solution on the Palestinians will be rejected by the Palestinians as well as the Arabs". Both these interviews were apparently given before the announcement of the new American peace proposals.

3. It would be wrong to place too much emphasis on these statements which, if they show any shift in the emphasis of Iraqi policy, do so by innuendo. They at least indicate that Iraq is as unwilling as ever to play any positive rôle in publicly seeking

*It was indeed  
R.M.  
8/7*

P.R.M. Hinchcliffe Esq.,  
Near Eastern Dept.,  
F.C.O.

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seeking a peaceful solution to the Palestine problem. Privately, Iraq has during successive crises in Lebanon and Jordan been building up a relationship with the more moderate commando organisations and Iraqi mediation in the recent Jordan imbroglio (two-faced though it may have been) received favourable comment from Hashemite as well as Egyptian quarters. There is however no indication that now, or in the immediate future, the régime would wish to influence the Palestinians in favour of a peaceful solution.

*Yours  
Mike/  
(M.K. Jenner)*

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sent Mr G. King (U.S. EMBASSY)

Encl. Mr. ~~Markins~~ O.R.  
Miss Beckett

B. 12/6

2/3

Dear Peter,

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RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
- 7 AUG 1970  
NEM 3 / 359

BRITISH EMBASSY,

BAGHDAD.

1 August 1970.

Iraqi attitude to Egyptian acceptance  
of the Rogers proposals

As you will have seen in press reports from Beirut Iraq has come out noisily against the Egyptian acceptance of the Rogers proposals. The first official indication of this came in a statement by the Revolutionary Command Council on 26 July confirming Iraq's rejection of the Security Council resolution of November 1967, rejecting "surrender solutions" which would throw the fate of Palestine into the whirlpool of bargaining between hostile interests and finally rejecting any solution, in particular the recent American proposals, which would bring an end to the Palestine question and deny Palestinians their right to return to their country. The statement promised Iraq's support for any steps which would strengthen Arab determination. This was followed on 28 July by a statement by the National Leadership of the Ba'ath Party which condemned the Rogers plan and said: "Numerous Arab and international quarters now seek to camouflage the capitulatory and liquidatory character of such plans. Worse than that certain ruling Arab quarters have officially accepted these plans before consulting either the Arab people, the struggling revolutionary forces in Palestine, or the Arab revolutionary forces which have the final word on this issue". The statement then philosophized at length about the revolutionary spirit of the Arab people, of which the Ba'ath Party was an important element, which rejected any peaceful solution and saw no alternative to armed struggle until Palestine was liberated by force. The Arab people and their revolutionary forces, according to this statement, realised that they might not yet be in a position to achieve their goal of the complete liberation of Palestine, but no people in the world had ever won freedom in a single battle or by a set deadline. The road to freedom was a protracted revolutionary struggle but it was based on a realistic revolutionary attitude, not on a shallow emotional one. The Arab people were concerned with the thinking of the "ruling factions" only inasmuch as that thinking conformed with revolution; in the event of a contradiction arising between the two attitudes the masses would choose the thinking of revolution. The statement concluded by saying that the Rogers proposals were merely an American Imperialistic attempt to implement the Security Council resolution in such a way as to give maximum advantage to Israel; the plan would involve recognition of "the Zionist occupation of Palestine" and peaceful co-existence with it - in other words the

/final

P.R.M. Hinchcliffe Esq.,  
Near Eastern Dept.,  
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final relinquishment of Arab rights in Palestine and the utter liquidation of the Palestine resistance. The party called for the creation of an Arab front from all forces opposed to a peaceful solution. These two statements were of course accompanied by suitable noises in the editorial columns of the Press.

2. Iraqi opposition to the American plan reached its high point on 29 July with a mass demonstration following the approved route from Maidan Square to Tahrir Square. The demonstration, which was orderly and apparently well organized, was addressed by Sayid Issam Sakhnini, Head of the P.L.O. office in Baghdad.

3. On the same day it was announced that Murtadha al Hadithi and Vice-President Hardan Tikriti were to tour Arab capitals as President Bakr's special emissaries carrying messages explaining the Iraqi attitude towards the American proposals. Tikriti left immediately for Khartoum and has gone from there to Tripoli and Algiers. Murtadha al Hadithi is at present in Damascus and will later go to Amman and Cairo.

4. The Iraqi attitude was certainly predictable. The present Régime have consistently and often stated their opposition to a peaceful solution and in particular their rejection both of the November 1967 Security Council resolution and any peace plan based upon it. The small indications that there have been that they might accept some form of peaceful solution (see my letter 2/3 of 4 July) have been conditional upon such a solution being acceptable to the commando organizations. The apparently total rejection by the commando organizations (two small ones apparently excepted) of the American plan and the Egyptian acceptance of it made any other reaction by the Iraqis inconceivable. It is now reported that a delegation from the Government and the Ba'ath Party is in Amman holding talks with the Central Committee of the P.L.O. and the Government is said to be considering giving the commando organizations radio time from Baghdad to replace that withdrawn by the Egyptians.

5. To date the Iraqi reaction has been vociferous in its hostility. It remains to be seen whether or not this will be moderated by the reactions of other Arab Governments which Tikriti and Hadithi will collect. At the time of writing Jordan, Sudan and Libya among others have joined Egypt in accepting the Rogers proposals and even Syria seems to be exercising restraint (itself a good reason in Iraqi eyes for doing the opposite). It may be that Iraq will find herself governmentally isolated and will not find the support of the Fedayeen sufficient to sustain her in this isolation - though she may of course be calculating that the peace moves will fail anyway, thus proving her to have been "right" all along. Iraq therefore seems to be the only

/Arab

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Arab country whose attitude is entirely negative; and Pravda has, I understand, singled her out for criticism on this score. Saddam Hussain may have a rough ride when he visits Moscow on 4 August - assuming that he still goes.

4/11/5

*Yours  
Mike  
(M.K. Jenner)*

Copied to Chanceries in Beirut, Amman, Khartoum, Cairo, Tripoli, Algiers, Moscow.

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6

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 533

10 AUGUST 1970

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11 AUG 1970  
NEM 3/359

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 533 OF 10 AUGUST AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO CAIRO, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, BEIRUT, ALGIERS AND MOSCOW AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND PARIS.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 527.

PURSUING ITS DECLARED INTENTION OF REVEALING NASSER AS A SPINELESS TRAITOR TO THE ARAB CAUSE AND COUNTERING THE SLANDERS OF HIS INFORMATION MEDIA THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT HAS ISSUED A FURTHER STATEMENT PUBLISHED IN YESTERDAY'S PRESS.

2. THE STATEMENT BEGINS BY SLANGING NASSER FOR NOT DEPLOYING TROOPS ON THE EASTERN FRONT AND GOES ON TO PUBLISH A FACSIMILE OF THE IRAQI/LIBYAN "PLAN" SIGNED BY PRESIDENTS BAQR AND QADDAFI DURING THE LATTER'S VISIT HERE ON 4 JUNE, AND PREVIOUSLY KEPT SECRET.

3. UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS "PLAN", WHICH WAS TO BE ENDORSED AT THE FIRST TRIPOLI MEETING, THE SEVEN PARTICIPANT STATES (LEBANON IS NOT MENTIONED) WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A JOINT ATTACK ON ISRAEL AT A FIXED ZERO HOUR; ALL DECISIONS WERE TO BE BINDING IF SUPPORTED BY A TWO-THIRDS VOTE; NO PARTICIPANT COULD WITHDRAW OR ALTER COURSE AND PRESIDENTS BOUMEDIENNE AND QADDAFI WERE TO ACT AS REFEREES.

4. PUBLICATION OF THIS JEJEUNE DOCUMENT SEEMS MORE LIKELY TO EMBARRASS QADDAFI THAN NASSER.

5. TEXT OF PLAN FOLLOWS BY BAG.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO ALGIERS AND KHARTOUM AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND PARIS.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

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② NA

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✓ *W.M.*  
b/w

Q. 1/8.

Iraqi-Libyan Proposals

During the visit of Libyan R.C.C. Chairman and Prime Minister Muammar al-Qaddafi upon an invitation extended to him by his brother President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, between 30/5 - 4/6 1970, the two Presidents studied the development of the Palestinian issue and the means of confronting the Zionist aggression on the Arab nation on the basis of the Libyan proposal and agreed on a unified project reflecting the viewpoints of the Iraqi and Libyan areas concerning this issue of destiny.

"The project is based on reconsidering the current Arab stand in the light of the great developments affecting the Palestinian issue and the stands of the great powers vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the light of the balance of power policy adopted by the great powers. The viewpoints expounded in this project are based on two important points;

(a) The necessity of defining the goal of complete liberation of the usurped Arab lands and the drawing up of a strategy to achieve this purpose based on "attack" rather than steadfastness in "defence" considering attack as the best means of defence;

(b) Arab capabilities in their various forms have reached an important limit necessitating the reconsideration of the strategy adopted since the setback which still exists despite changes in political circumstances and in the development of Arab capabilities. To achieve this we propose the following:

- (1) "An invitation should be extended to the following Arab states: Iraq, U.A.R., Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan, Libya, Sudan and Algeria to meet in Libya in order to study the new Arab policy which is "attack for complete liberation" and in order to mobilise all the necessary energies and capabilities required by this policy on the basis of each country's possibilities i.e. the proportion of national income to the number of population.
- (2) "The Chiefs of Staff or Ministers of Defence will be entrusted with draw-up plans of attack and estimate requirements for the battle." /ing
- (3) "Reconsideration of the army's deployment in accordance with the plan of attack within a nationalist conception of the battle and in those places threatening vital enemy centres.
- (4) "Consideration of the Arab lands as one battlefield on which Arab armies move without regional obstacles.
- (5) "The formation of a single Supreme Military Command from which branch command units are formed, away from regional effects." *sub  
21/8*

- (6) "Fixing the zero hour to begin with the attack.
- (7) "The Heads of State or those deputed to represent them will be vested with the necessary authority to accept the obligations imposed on the states.
- (8) "The decisions are considered obligatory for the participant states if they receive two-thirds of the votes of those attending.
- (9) "None of the participant states in the meeting shall change its stand or take any course contrary to what has been approved.
- (10) "An Arab political and information plan shall be drawn up to prepare Arab and international public opinion for the Arab attack.
- (11) "Presidents Boumedienne and Qaddafi shall be judges of the stands of the states participating in this meeting.
- (12) "After approving the above, invitations shall be extended to all Arab states to join in the battle as per their capabilities and on the basis mentioned in para (1).

"Signed by Muammar al-Qaddafi, Chairman of the Libyan R.C.C. and Prime Minister, and Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, President of the Iraqi Republic, on June 4, 1970."

? *Beograd*.

Copies to recipients of *telegram no. 533 of 10 August*



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

(2/3)

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125
NEM 3/359/1

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15 August, 1970

(8)

1. Mr. Roans  
2. Mr. Murphy  
3. Mrs. Beale

24.8.

Dear Peter, (8M) 125/1 IX K26/8 Encl.

Natural bloodymindedness may or may not be enough to explain the Iraq Government's opposition to the Rogers proposals and (what may be of greater interest) its violent attack on Nasser for accepting them. The question would be academic if one assumes that the Iraqi attitude doesn't matter anyway. I should like to think it didn't. But if only because of the presence of 12,000 Iraqi troops in Jordan, I believe that the Iraqi posture needs a little further study - both the reasons for it and the possible consequences of it.

2. In my telegram No. 528 I advanced three current interpretations:

125 NEM 3/304/1

- (a) That they reckon that, whether the American initiative succeeds or fails, they themselves stand to lose nothing either way by opposing it. If it succeeds and peace breaks out, the Iraqis will nobly yield to force majeure (breathing perhaps a sigh of relief in the process). If it fails, they will claim credit for having been right all along and having never parleyed with defeatism. An irresponsible attitude, of course, credited to them by my East European colleagues, amongst others.
- (b) That even if they contemplated modifying their extremist stand, they would use it first as a bargaining counter at the Moscow talks (which have now just ended). Whether this has proved to be the case, and if so to what effect, we do not know and may never learn. It does not of course follow that if some sort of bargain was struck in Moscow this would immediately be reflected in a public change of posture here. The anti-Nasser campaign does in fact seem to have died down slightly. On the other hand, local Kremlinologists declare that there is nothing in the texts of the opening statements in Moscow or of the final communique to suggest a meeting of minds.

1(c)

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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16  
22/8



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(c) That, by aligning themselves wholly with the Fedayin, and in the belief that the fox Hussain cannot survive this time, they are determined to be in at the kill and secure at least the brush. I return to this in paragraph 4 below.

3. A fourth explanation bandied about here is that the continuation of the battle is invaluable to them as an ideological rallying-call as well as being a distraction from problems nearer home, and that the Eastern Front is a convenient place of exile for politically unreliable officers. These considerations may at least be a contributory factor but could only be the central one if the Iraqi Ba'ath genuinely believe their own propaganda (that the Arab "masses", as distinct from their spineless governments, are unanimously behind a continuation of the struggle). Unlikely but just possible.

4. It is 2(c) above, because it has material implications, that I would like to consider further. If that idea is in their minds, they presumably expect (in the event of the peace initiative failing) that extremist views will increasingly dominate the Resistance movement, that the latter will make a determined bid to oust the monarchy, that the Salah-ud-Din Force will be asked or be able to get in on the act, and that the outcome will be a republican Jordan indebted to Iraq and sympathetic to Iraqi Ba'athism - a development which would (they may think) extend their ideological empire, cut Nasser down to size and greatly embarrass their hated rivals in Damascus.

5. This theory has its attractions, and their obvious lionizing of George Habbash would suit the view that they have marked him as their chosen instrument for ~~some~~ purpose. On the other hand:

- (a) It is by no means certain that the Iraqis at present want to see Hussain ousted. So far they have conspicuously avoided associating Hussain with Nasser in their slanging match with the latter. (Moreover, they may not be wholly confident that the Salah-ud-Din Force would act against Hussain if so instructed.)
- (b) Even the Iraqis must recognise that any sort of responsibility for the government of Jordan in the shambles and destitution that would follow a forcible republican takeover by the Palestinians would be no easy burden.

/(c)

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(c) Moreover they could hardly thereafter avoid direct military involvement with Israel - something for which, as Nasser has pointed out, they have so far shown singularly little enthusiasm. ✓

(d) Finally, a successful revolution in Jordan by the Fedayin may not by any means be a prospect welcome in the immediate future to Moscow. The Russians must surely have warned Saddam Hussain during his visit to keep off this bit of grass as well as to watch his step in other ways. 1

6. On balance, and at the risk of over-rationalising their calculations, I conclude that the Iraqis are probably not moved to adopt their present posture by the prospect of any positive and material dividend accruing to themselves from the (expected) failure of the peace initiative. No doubt they look to a propaganda dividend and other possible benefits of a negative kind such as the humbling of Nasser. In fact, unless we believe their devotion to the destruction of Israel to be both sincere and purposeful, we are (happily) driven back to bloodymindedness as their basic stimulus. Whether their ranting is all that harmless, however, is a slightly different question. It seems to me to have at least a nuisance value. Even if Iraqi opposition to peace is just what is needed to strengthen Nasser's determination to pursue it, it may nonetheless encourage extremism amongst at least the Palestinians themselves. Whether the Russians attach much importance to it may be evident from the effect on the party line here of Saddam's visit to Moscow; or again it may not. The Russians might, I suppose, be content with an assurance that, if a settlement does seem to be shaping up, the Iraqis will not get in the way. 1

*Yours ever*

*Glenn*

(H. G. ~~Balfour~~ Paul)

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SAVING TELEGRAM

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BY BAG

BAKHAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

EL. NO. 6 SAVING

7 SEPTEMBER 1970

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10 SEP. 1970  
NEM 3/359/

Addressed to F.C.O. telno. 6 (SAVING) of 7 September  
repeated (SAVING) Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Tripoli.

Summary of the Iraqi Press  
30 August to 5 September

The government newspaper Al-Jumhuriyah and the Ba'ath party newspaper Al-Thawra printed daily editorials condemning the Rogers plan and criticising those "reactionary" and "defeatist" elements which supported it. Al-Thawra (2 September) said that the struggle in Palestine was between the revolutionary Arab masses and the Imperialist/Zionist alliance. It was the responsibility of the Iraqi people together with the "real" revolutionary régimes and the armed struggle to reject all plans for the liquidation of the Palestine question. Al-Jumhuriyah (4 September) said that Cairo's acceptance of the Rogers plan and her relinquishment of her nationalist obligations had brought the Palestinian revolution to a critical stage. Now that Cairo had stabbed the Arab cause in the back, reaction in Jordan felt that it was passing through a golden era and was dreaming of liquidating the Palestinian revolution. Al-Thawra (31 August) said that King Hussein's broadcast speech on 29 August constituted a threat to the Palestinian revolution and a step towards the recognition of Israel.

2. Both Al-Jumhuriyah and Al-Thawra reacted violently in their editorial columns to the clash between the commandos and the Jordanian army on 1 September. Al-Jumhuriyah, referring to the Iraqi ultimatum to Jordan, said that it was natural that Iraq should receive the admiration of all the Arab people and of liberals and revolutionaries throughout the world for her support for the commando organizations. The Iraqi army was the main stable force in the field and was in a position to tip the scales in favour of the resistance forces: these forces had no-one to resort to other than Iraq. Undoubtedly the conspirators realised that Iraq was /serious

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serious in her warning and would be compelled to bow before her revolutionary weight. Al-Thawra said that the capitulatory forces realised that the resistance forces were a stumbling block in the way of their plans and were therefore overtly and covertly planning to liquidate those forces.

3. The Kurdish newspaper Al-Taakhi reserved its editorial columns during this period largely for discussion of internal Iraqi problems. However on 3 September in an editorial headed "Effect of the painful events in Jordan in weakening the Arab Front" the writer says that differences between some Arab governments and certain commando organizations which had developed into fighting threatened a split in the Arab Front and the development of internal battles which would divert the Arabs from their original aims. The Arabs should be practical about the situation; the commandos should retain their independent attitude and should not be influenced by the attitudes of Arab governments or by international politics. The Kurds would continue to support the Arab people with caution and vigilance and would consider a settlement of the differences between them as a victory for the Arabs.

4. Al-Thawra (4 September) printed an article by Khairallah Talfah, Governor of Baghdad, which suggested the following two requirements of a peaceful solution:

- (a) The removal of all immigrants to Palestine, Arabs or non-Arabs, to their countries of origin.
- (b) The establishment of a Government of Palestine representative of Muslims, Christians and Jews on the lines of the present system of government in Lebanon.

MR. HAWLEY

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